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PRIVATE AND SOCIAL RETURNS TO EDUCATION IN LABOUR SURPLUS ECONOMIES 
Gary S. Fields 
Economists have worked mainly within the framework of full employment 
economies in assessing the returns to education. When one turns to the 
educational problems of less developed countries, he often encounters a 
situation of surplus labour. 
In the sense used by Ranis and Fei, there is surplus labour when 
removal of a worker leads to no reduction in output; the marginal product 
of the last worker is zero, and workers are paid their average products. 
However, a situation of surplus labour also easts when there is general 
unemployment throughout an economy, as in India, or in large segments of an 
economy, as in most other underdeveloped economies. Such a situation 
is the result of inaitutionally rigid wages set for any number of reasons 
above the market-clearing rate. Marginal products are positive but 
unemployment persists. 
In surplus--labour cases of'the latter"£ype^Htfie~poIlcy prescription 
very often proposed is a massive investment in education. The benefits 
claimed for education are many. At the upper end, it is argued that more 
education,vjIII eliminate structural imbalances and hottTemecks as th:e 
supply ,of highly-educated manpower is equated to demand; that more educa-
tion will create an elite local intelligentsia to lead the effrt of 
2 . political and economic nation-building; that the greater the number of 
opportunities for being educated at the highest levels, the greater the 
efforts at all lower levels as people aspire to the top. At the lower 
end it is argued that r c : v -r - . 
Substantial indirect returns accrue from the role of the 
primary school in generalising within a nation basic con<= 
cepts of progressing and rationality, in awakening 
aspirations, and in aiding the discovery of latent talent. 
It can also play a major role in economic development by 
reducing social dualism in society, creating a literate 
electorate, and in improving consumption patterns^ 
It is also argued that African Socialism and similar ideologies not 
only promise education for the masses but rely upon the educational 
JohnO.H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, Development of the Labor Surplus Economy, 
Homewood, Illinois, Irwin, 1964. 
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See, for example, Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison, and 
Charles A. Myers, Industrialism arid industrial Man, Oxford University 
Press, 1963. 3. Report of the Meeting of Ministers of Education of Asian Member States 
Participating in the Karachi Plan, in M.J. Bowman, et.al., ed., Readings 
in the Economics of Education, Paris, UNESCO, 1968, pp. 148=150. 
system to, in the words cf President Nyerere of Tanzania, "Encourage the 
4 • ~ ~• growthc£-the socialist values we aspire to." 
Hie specific agenda of this paper is as follows. Section 1 revios 
the debate over the applicability of oost=benefit analysis to problems of 
investment in education and concludes that the cost=benefit approach is 
indeed useful6 Section 2 distinguishes private returns from social returns 
and enumerates the likely benefits and costs, both private and social, from 
education. Section 3 focuses on full employment economies and cites some 
of the empirical evidence on the similarities between private and social 
returns. Section 4 looks at the private returns to education in labour 
surplus economies, and Section 5 at the social returns. Section 6 contains 
some concluding remarks. , . 
1. In Defense of a Cost-Benefit Approach tQ>tbe Econcoicc of. .Education 
In order to assess the returns from social projects, economists and 
other social scientists have relied on cost=benefit analysis' "as the major 
technique for evaluation and decisipn«*natcing• According to this criterion, 
the higher the ratio, (or difference) between discounted benefits and costs, 
the more worthwhile the project. .•• 
Cost=-benefit analysis utilizes one of two alternative approaches: 
either rate°of«return or present value. The relative merits of the two 
approaches have been argued in the literature, and it is noted that the 
approaches may yield different results in comparing the worth of one 
project relative to another. Hirshleifers.s well,=known paper on optimal 
investment decisions makes the following points: 
The main positive conclusion of the paper is that the 
present"value rule for investment decision is correct 
in a wide variety of cases (though not universally) »>. 
Hie main negative conclusion is that the internal«rate° 
of=>return rule for the multiperiod case is not generally 
correct. . • •..••» 
_ — ; — ; —••. ~ • ' 
Julius K» Nyerere, "Education for "Self-Reliance,?!. in Ujamaa; .Essays 
on Socialism, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1968. 
5* J. Hirshleifer, "On the. Theory.of Optimal Investment. Decision," 
JPE, August, 1958.' ; - " • ' ' ..V': 
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The merits and deficiencies of cost-benefit analysis as a. criterion 
for social decision-making have been discussed at length in the literature. 
The most comprehensive look at the subject is the 1965 survey article 
by Prest and Turvey,, As they describe cost-benefit analysis; 
Cost-benefit analysis is a practical way os assessing the 
desirability of projects, where it is important to take a 
long-view (in the sense of looking at repercussions in the 
further, as well as the nearer, future) and a"wide view 
(in the sense of allowing for sidekeffects of many kinds 
on many persons, industries., regions, etc,) i.e0, it implies 
the enumeration and evaluation of all the relevant costs 
and benefits, 
The authors then go on togive an exhaustive list of the main questions 
which must be answered in practical applications of the technique,, These 
questions'involve the enumeration and valuation of costs and benefits, 
choice of interest rate, and sievant constraint-s.- - specific aub^issues 
under these headings are discussed in detail. While the problems are 
many and complex, Prest and Turvey conclude that coSt-benefit analysis 
is a very useful technique, although they caution the reader that 
applications to the public-utility areas of government are apt to be * =-•' 
mbre- fr-uitful- than in the social-services areas. A large number of 
practitioners in the field of the economics of education = — including 
K 7 - 8 9 10 Becker , Hansen , Weisbrod , and Blaugl; — have proceeded.to use cost-
benefit analysis and calculate rates of return to education,- while 
recognizing the limitations of thsr estimates. Others — Arrow , 
-i.:: i2 - 13 • 
Bowen , and Bowman — are"among the firm believersin the- soeialrate 
of return to education as a criterion for social investment despite 
practical difficulties. — 
However, such a view is not unanimously shared* Perhaps the 
strongest blast at the rate of return to education cortdept "was made by 14 " • • ' r " ' ' 4 *"• • Merrett , who, after considering the problems of enumerating costs and 
6~. ~ 
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Journal of Political Economy, October, 1962, part 2 (supplement), 
pp. 106-123. 
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Britain," The Machester School, 1965, reprinted in Blaug M., ed., 
Economics of Education I, London, Penguin Books, 1968, pp» 215-259i 
(footnotes carried on 
on page 4) 
benefits and estimating rates of return by econometric techniques, con-
eluded quite simply that "research into the rate of return on education 
should be discontinued." Balogh and Streeten scorn the social rate of 
return to education as the "coefficient of ignorance." In the context 
16' ' ''' 17 of less developed economies, Jolly and Okigbo submit that a manpower 
: 18 planning appraach is much more fruitful than cost-beaefit. v Vaizey 
remains an agnostic. None of these writers disagrees with the notion of 
cost-benefit analysis in principle. Howeveri they all feel that the 
practical problems are so serious as to render the technique useless in 
educational research. -
11. 
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e,t.a 1., Readings in the Economics of Education, Paris, UNESCO, 
1968, pp. 869-880. 
Bowen, William G., "Assessing the Economic Contribution of Education," 
in M. Blaug. ed., Economics of Education 1, London, Penguin Books, 
1968, pp. 67-100. - . v 
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in Educational Planning," in M, Blaug, ed., Economics of Education 1, 
London, Penguin Books, 1968, pp. 351-382. 
Merrett, Stephen, "The Rate of Return to Education, -A Critique," 
Oxford Economic Papers, November, 1966, pp. 289-303. 
Balogh, <T. and-Streeten, P.P., "The Coefficient of. Ignorance," : 
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, 
May, 1963, pp. 99=107. 
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Okigbo, P.N»C., "Criteria for Public Expenditure on Education," 
in Robinson, E#A«G. and Vaizey, J*E», ed., The Economics of Education, 
Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic 
Association, London, MacMillan_and Co. Ltd., 1966, pp. 479-496. 
is.::...;.." . " * ..r" * ~ ' 
Vaizey, J»E«, "Criteria for Public Expenditure on Education,".in 
Robinson, E,AG. and Vaizey, J.E,, ed., The Economics of Education", 
Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic 
Association, London, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1966, pp. 451-462. 
My own view is that the economist*s main contribution to social 
decision-making in the field of education is to approximate, if only crudely, 
19 20 the marginal social and benefits of an educational endeavour. For even 
if his estimates are substantially off-the-mark, he will at least have raised 
explicitly the right questions. As I argue below, the marginal social costs 
and benefits from education depend in large measure on labour market condi-
tions. I am in full agreement with the approach of manpower planners to 
give supply and demand conditions heavy weight in educational decisions; But 
I belifyea manpower planning approach that blindly plans supply to match 
demand is Very likely to give answers which are wrong in terms of a welfare-
or output-maximization criterion. For example^ the decision to expand a 
country's university should depend on marginal social costs and benefits 
and not on considerations of manpower shortages alone. 
The problems of enumerating the marginal social costs and benefits 
or education are many and difficult. Just to cite a few of the more important 
ones, wages do not measure the marginal productivity of graduates or the 
marginal resource costs of inputs to the educational system; the demand for 
workers of different educational categories shifts in response to expansion 
on both the economic and educational fronts; both the economic and non-economic 
benefits from education are very difficult to enumerate, let alone quantify, 
ftiese problems are challenging, if not downright discouraging?to._p_ractitioners 
of the bost-benefit approach. However, economic research has exhibited an 
encouraging tendency to improve over time. As researchers are made more aware 
of the limitations of the initial efforts of their colleagues, as they seek 
new ways of dealing withjconceptual and measurement problems, and as new and 
better data sets become available, more thorough and precise aaalysis will 
hopefully emerge. In the interim, I submit it is better to use imperfect 
approximations of social rates of return based on incomplete information than 
not to consider social returns at all. 
19C 
20. 
I use the term "marginal" to refer in general to either large or 
small changes on the margin. 
This viewpoint is shared by W,C, Gash. See "A Critique of Manpower 
Planning in Africa," in M. Blaug, ed., Economics of Education 2, 
London, Penguin Books, 1969, pp. 98-122. 
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2. Private Returns vs. Social, Returns 
, : The costs,incurred and benefits received by society generally do 
not'/equal the. costs and benefits to the .individual, although'they may'be 
of, the same ..general magnitude.-: The social costs of education-include ' « , 
the value - of the resources . used :to Construct and maintain school facilities 
and to train teachers, the output foregone by employing highly»educated 
persons as teachers rather than in some other occupation, the.output foregone 
by having potentially-productive workers in school rather than,on the. joh, 
and the other social projects which must be foregone in order to provide 
students with financial aid. In contrast, the private costs to the student 
(and/or his family) include foregone earnings, and out-of-pocket costs of v 
schooling. . ., . • .-.r.v. . . I . 
A stream of benefits can be considered at one level from the viewpoint 
of additional income, either national income or personal disposable income. 
More generally, benefits can be viewed as increments to social welfare or 
personal utility, one component of which is income. Die welfare/utility 
approach is conceptually more appealing, although it may operationally be 
little value. . .... . ... .. 
. Social welfare is presumed to depend positively on output..(net of 
education costs) the fraction of the labeuv force employed, the fraction of 
the labour force educated beyond a certain level, and equality of opportunity 
and income distribution.. Personal utility is presumed to depend positively 
on the present value of.net lifetime disposable income and the quality,. 
21 
status,..and. other non-pecuniary-aspects of the job which a person holds. 
Hie net marginal social benefit from education is the increment to social 
welfare if one more person is educated; the gross benefit would,disregard 
the cost of schooling. Similarly, the.net marginal personal benefit to an 
individual from additional education is the increment to personal utility 
if he becomes educated. 
The composition and total amount of the costs and benefits from 
education depend critically on the nature of the labour market for educated 
persons. The cases of excess demand and excess supply for educated persons 
will be considered in turn. 
21c 
The omission of leisure as an argument in the utility function is 
intended to avoid the unnecessary complication of considering work-
leisure choices. Work hours can be assumed to be institutionally 
fixed without serious' distortion^, _.. . .. , 
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3. Returns to Education in Full'Bmployment Economies, --•'••'-
Traditional human capital theory has dealt' at considerable length 
with this case, which holds for full employment economies and for 
occupations requiring either very high-level or very specific training 
in economies which otherwise have surplus labour. In cases where excess 
demand prevails, graduates cna easily find a job utilizing their skills 
and can expect only brief periods of frictional unemployment. 
When a person is educated for an excess demand occupation, at a 
minimum society gains the value of his marginal product on his new job. 
If his employment helps to relieve a skilled labour bottleneck which had 
been retarding production, there may be additional output effects result-
ing from further employment of unskilled labour. There may be shortages 
of less-educated persons,to fill the job he would have had, but a replace-
ment is. often available. Society benefits from higher output, additional 
employment, a greater fraction of its labour force educated, and, under 
most circumstances, a more equal income distribution.^^ Society incurs 
the costs enumerated in the previous section. The social rate of return is 
that discount rate which equates the present values of costs and benefits. 
The educated person himself benefits froma higher-level job which 
generally offers higher pay, more stable employment, and superior working 
— - - 23 
'conditions and other non-pecuniary benefits. He may experience gains 
~£n" wiiTty* from higher status'or from^ a' 'richer or more-fulfilling life* 
22. 
Even if a replacement is not available, there will be higher output to 
the extent that the educated worker's marginal product is higher or his 
new job than it would have been if he were not educated and worked in 
some lower-level job. And the output gains from relief of bottlenecks 
are still realized. 
23. 
I say "generally" because there are cases in which persons may choose 
to be educated in order to receive additional non-pecuniary benefitsat 
the expense of lower pay and/or less stable employment. Monetarily speak-
- ing, a liberal arts major may earn more selling insurance than he would 
with a Ph.D. in philosophy. But graduate schools have more applicants 
than openings. It may also be that employment is less stable for the 
graduates in some fields. For instance, aerospace engineers in the 
United States chose an occupation which offered high salaries and the 
excitenent of a new scientific endeavor. Thoughtful observers foretold 
the instability of the labour market, but many engineers are today 
regretfully experiencing the consequences of their lack of foresight. 
Looking at the private costs, due to the abundance of -job opportunities 
at most educational levels in full employment economies, foregone earnings 
may be substantial. In additon, out-of-pocket costs, may be very large, ... in ' :-•••• , 
since students/labour shortage economies often pay a large part of their 
schooling costs themselves. While the benefits may be considerable, 
the costs may also be, so that private rates of return, while positive, are 
often not particularly great. 
Private costs and social costs are reasonably cbse to one another. 
Furthermore,1 since there is virtual full employment of graduates with 
wages reflecting marginal productivity, the economic benefits to society 
and to the individual are of the same order of magnitude. Thus, one would 
expect the social and private rates of return to education in full employment 
economies^to be very similar. -..'.-: 24 
Hie work by Hansen on rates of return to schooling in the United 
Statsscan be used to illustrate this point. He calculated social and 
private money rates of return by comparing increments to income streams which 
can presumably be attributed to education in relation to costs. His 
estimates of the "internal rates of return to total resource investment in 
schooling" and "internal rates of return to private resource investment in 
schooling after tax" for various increments fo education are; 
' Rate of Return to late of Return to 
,.-•-.;.-• :-•.. ..Total Resource •> •'• Private Resource invests 
Increment in Schooling Investment ... ment After Tax 
Grade 10 over grade 8 9.5% _ .12.3% 
Grade 12 over grade "10""' 13.7 17.5 
Grade 14 over grade 12 5.4 5.1 
Grade 16 over grade 14 15.6 16.7 
Hie close similarity between private .and total resource rates of return 
is attributable to the fact that'the cost measures are similar in magnitude 
and the benefit streams identical} which in a labour surplus economy would 
be impossible. Hansen is very careful to state all the limitations of his -
analysis and to note that he has "barely begun to consider" any kind of social 
rate of return; But the cautious conclusion can be drawn that the private 
and social rates of return to education in the United States are not very 
different. 
24. 
W. Lee Hansen, "Total and Private Rates of Return to Investment in 
Schooling," Journal of Political Economy, 1963, pp. 128-141. 
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4• Private Returns to Education in Labour Surplus, Economies 
Priyr.to Costs 
The private costs of' education in labour surplus economies are in 
many cases quite small.; The earnings foregone by an individual depend 
not only upon the wage rate but also upon the probabilities of employment, 
underemployment and unemployment, The younger the individual and the 
lower his educational attainment, the lower.the wage and the likelihood 
of employment.1 In labour surplus economies, in which there are large 
numbers of un- and under- employed in search of work, the probability of 
employment for a school-age person may bo very low indeed. Hence, 
foregone earnings may 'bo a small item to the individual. Under existing 
institutional arrangements in many underdeveloped countries, either the 
entire amount or a large fraction of the out-of-pocket costs of 
education are paid by the central government. The higher the education 
level, the more likely this is to be the case. Hencc the out-of-pocket 
costs of schooling may be very small or, to the.extent that students 
receive.cash allowances, even negative. In sum, the private costs of 
education in labour surplus economies may amount to very little. 
Private Benefits 
The private benefits from education in labour surplus economies 
may be. very large. Percentage wage differentials between different skill 
levels in labour surplus economies a.re. much-, greater than in full employ— 
n^^econwnies, particularly in Africa. r Furthermore those with the most 
education and those trained in specific excess demand skills experience 
much ipore stable employment than persons with loss education. Expected 
lifetime income for university graduates may be several times as high as 
for secondary school leavers, who in turn "may expect to earn several , 
times as much as primary sehool leaversi" These high private benefits, 
compared with the low private costs, load to a very high rate of return 
for most educational investments. " 
25 In Kenya, school fees cover around one-fourth of the gross cost 
of primary education, one-fifth of the costs of secondary education. 
No fees are charged at post-secondary teachers' colleges or agricul-
tural training institutions. Kenyan university students studying in 
East Africa in theory are charged £300 per year tuition, but bursaries 
are-so extensive-that fees pay only' 6fo of the costs of the University 
of Nairobi. See my "The Educational System of Kenya: An Economist's 
View", University of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies 
Discussion Paper No. 103 April, 1971. 
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Private Demand, for Education 
The policy of paying- the full costs of higher levels of education 
for virtually everyone who can find spaces in the schools exchanges 
one imperfection in capital markets for another, resulting in a'V'eT?y 
high private demand for education. The original imperfection was that 
capital markets did not operate sufficiently well to allow students from 
low—income families to. borrow long-term funds to pay the short—terms costs 
of their schooling in cases where the marginal private benefits exceeded 
the,marginal private costs. This capital market imperfection seriously 
retarded private demand amongst the. local population and this Situation 
was judged socially undesirable in view of the goal of equality of 
educational opportunity for citizens. The full-subsidy scheme, in contrast, 
not only excludes the very real capital costs from the price of investing 
in human capital but excludes all out-of-pocket costs as well. Under this 
scheme the marginal private-benefits are much greater than the marginal 
private costs, so the private rate of return is very high. Without any 
constraints imposed by the necessity of financing educational investment 1 
by recourse to a capital market, this high return is readily translated 
into a very high- private demand which is much greater than it would have 
been under the original scheme. Enrollments are limited not by a private 
rate of return which bears any relation to,the true social costs and .,.;„-•.-.-
benefits, not by inavailability of capital, but rather by the capacities 
of the educational institutions. The likely consequences - dissatisfaction 
and political pressure to expand the educational system beyond a socially 
optimal size' — may be more serious than the original state of affairs. 
If the government hows to political pressure and decides to educate 
another person, what will happen to the demand for education? The result 
depends critically on the motivations for seeking education. 
26 Case 1: Labour Market Stratification 
Suppose a person seeks to avoid a low-level job which he perceives '." 
as "menial" or "dirty" and therefore desires education to qualify for a ' 
high-level job even though he expects to be .unemployed at least part _of 
the time. Prom the point of view of an employer, education may make such' ' 
a person lesjg desirable for a job. For instance, the morale of a secondary 
school graduate employed as a sweeper may be so low that a person with 
less-than .a primary school education woula be more productive» We. thus 
26 Formal .models of this and the next case are to be presented in 
a forthcoming I.D.S,. paper. . : : • ? "•' 
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If the government bows to political pressure and decides to 
educate another person, what will happen to the demand 
ibr education? The result depends critically on the motivations 
for seeking education. 
Case 1: Labour Market Stratification 26 
Formal models of this and the next case are to be presented in 
a forthcomig I.D.S. paper. 
Suppose a person seeks to avoid a low-level job which he 
perceives as "menial" or "dirty" and therefore, desires education 
to qualify for a high-level job even though he expects to be 
unemployed at least part of the- time. From the point of view 
of an employer, education may make such a person less desirable 
for a job. For instance, the morale of a secondary school 
graduate employed as a sweeper may be so low that a person with 
less than a primary school education would be more productive. 
We thus have a situation of (1) Highly-educated workers in the 
market for skilled jobs only, (2) Employers not wishing to hire 
highly-educated workers for low-level jobs, (3) Workers with 
little education being unqualified for high-level jobs, and 
(4) Employers preferring to hire.persons with low education 
for low-level jobs. The net effect of this situation is to 
completely separate the high-skill and low-skill labour markets, 
except that the educational system is the means by which a person 
moves .from one to the other.. 
Rigid wages were presumed initially to Le the cause of unemployment. 
If workers at each level are employed until the marginal product of 
the last worker hired equals the wage rate, employment is -determinedf 
which then determines output. If another person is educated, he 
enters the skilled labour force, thereby reducing the expected 
probability of finding a job and reducing expected life-time 
income.for skilled workers. . Simultaneouslyv the expected 
probability of finding an unskilled job is increased, since there 
is one fewer job-seeker, which nriisse^  the expected lifetime income 
of unskilled workers. The difference between expected lifetime 
income for skilled and unskilled workers is reduced. 
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Since demand for education depends positively on the expected 
lifetime income differential, which is now smaller, there will 
be less demand for education. 
Case 2: "Bumping" 
Suppose that persons demand education in order to get the best 
job they can. In contrast to the previous example, education 
is demanded in order to stand a better chance of being hired as 
a sweeper. Many employers prefer to hire persons with more 
education, either because they are (or are believed to be) 
more productive or simply because employers prefer to 
associate with the better-educated. For whatever reason it 
occurs, preferential hiring by educational level will lead to 
the general upgrading of hiring standards and of the labour 
force in general so long as the. educdlpnal system produces 
more graduates than are needed to fill skilled positions and 
some of them are willing to seek employment at lower levels. 
Again, since wages are rigid, if productivity.effects are 
neglected, employment and output are . determinedThere will be . 
ordinarily be fewer educated persons seeking unskilled jobs than 
the number of unskilled jobs available., If the government 
now decides to educate another person, due to preferential 
hiring, the educated person moves to the.front of the queue and 
is hired first, "bumping" a less-educated person from a job. 
This lowers the expected probability of the remaining unskilled 
workers finding an unskilled job and also lowers the present value 
of expected lifetime income for .the unskilled. Since there are 
still the same number of educated workers looking for the same 
number of high-level jobs in thi skilled labour market, the expected 
lifetime income for persons in the skilled labour market is unchanged. 
The difference between expected lifetime income for Called and 
unskilled workers- is .increase^..resulting in a greater demand for 
education and even more political pressure. 
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5• Social Returns to Education in Labour Surplus Economies 
Socic-1 Coats 
In labour surplus economies} the social, costs- of education may be 
very much higher than the private, costs. Typically, labour surplus econo-
mies have a large and perhaps redundant-, supply of unskilled and uneducated 
labour, with severe shortages of both physical and human capital,, The 
educational system is a very large user of human and non-human capital„ 
A glance at the capital budgets, wage bills of teachers, and number of 
teacher training spaces relative to education for other occupations, in 
2Q • less developed countries confirms this view. Thus, the resources 
devoted to education in labour surplus economies are extremely valuable 
in light of the important alternative uses to which they could be put. 
There is an important counter-arguement to the view that the 
educational system is a large user of capital with valuable- alternative.." 
uses. With respect to human capital, many teachers are themselves only 
generally educated secondary school graduates of whom there is a surplus, 
30, 31. -j-^ ggg p e r s o n s were to enter the non-education labour market, 
they might find that they would fare no better than other secondary school 
leavers. Perhaps the low salary level of teachors as compared with other 
white-collar professionals is primarily a reflection of low opportunity 
productivity. With respect to physical capital, the resources used to 
construct schools might simply not be supplied otherwise. To the extent 
that labour is specially volunteered and physical materials are gathered 
or made, the real resource'cost may be quite small. 
28 one can only speculate on the relative magnitudes of the.-parsaactexG 
with respect to specific .cases, since, they differ from one country 
to another, few unambiquous results are attainable. Therefore, the 
results just derived in the text are not as unambiguous as they first 
appear. 
29... Out of the approximately 11,000 post-secondary students (excluding 
those at foreign universities) in Kenya, about two-thirds are enrolled 
£rin teacher education courses. Education accounts for 15$ of the 
Kenya Government budget and 10$ of its development expenditures. 
Personal emoluments to teaching and non-teaching staff in schools 
amounted to £10 million, which is 8$ of the Kenya Government budget. 
See "The Kenyan Educational, System.; An Economist's View", op.pit. 
30 In 1968, Kenya had 10,000 primary school teachers and nearly 1,500 
secondary teachers with less than university education and no teacher 
training. These are out of totals of 38,000 and 4,600 respectively. 
(Footnote 31 continued on next page) 
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Another very large component of -the social cost of education is 
the financial aid granted, to students. In many.less-developed countries-,, 
students in secondary and post—secondary education pay none or only a 
small fraction of the costs of their education, receive housing and other 
payments in kind, and in addition may receive a small cash living 
32 •••'•.•.••• allowance. The social value of these funds is represented "by the 
social -welfare which would bo realised if the money were used on the next 
best projects. 
In contrast to full employment economies, the output foregone by:. 
having potentially-productive workers in school in labour surplus economies 
is minimal. the definition of a labour surplus economy, there are ... r 
large numbers ,of unskilled workers relative to the demand,. Given this. ... 
pool of unemployed workers, to the extent.that -uneducated persons are •. - ..-. 
temporarily withdrawn from the labour force while in school, there are 
plenty of others to fill the jobs they would have held. There would be 
a loss of output only to the extent that the persons selected for further 
education are more productive on the job than those who replace them. 
Social,..Benefits > •• -
In labour surplus economies, the social benefits of -education.may 
be very small or" oven negative. If society educates another person, 
there .is some gain in social welfare from-that fact alone. If the edu-: 
cated jper&Qn_ can use .his 'skills to fill a job which would otherwise- be1 
vacant, this is just another version of the. labour-shortage case described 
in Section 3 and society gains all the benefits enumerated therein. But 
suppose instead that socioty educates a person at a level which only 
qualifies him for.jobs for.which other persons are already queueing. 
To., give a concrete example, suppose this, person receives a traditional 
31 Moorthy and Thore. propose an accelerator model for educational 
expansion, which they then test using Indian data. Their basic 
conclusion is that as low-level education is expanded, this requires 
an additional supply of "deep" • (i,.&. hich-lpvel) levels of education. 
They-then qualify their position 4gr noting'tliat "the education 
acceleration--principle 7fiiry be much more vigorous in a countryof: 'full 
employment- than "in Indij?. which at the moment is char^toriciod-T^r 'a' 
largo unemployed educator! labour especially at the nOD-tcchnica'l 
> levels ': Sbe S, Ivrlchna i:ccrt% and St on A.O. Th or o,: - ""Ac c ol oratror 
Theory in EducationT"'-TRtTian Economic Review,, February, 1959 PP*57~69» 
32 See. footnote 25» - . . 
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secondary education, which qualifies him for clork-level jobs which other 
secondary completers are also seeking.. What are the social benefits to 
society from having educated him? 
Case 1: Labour Market Stratifj._cajj.pn 
If the graduate enters the labour force for clerks, and the w^ge 
rate for clerks is fixed at level ¥-• above the market-clearing wage, c 
employment for clerks is unchanged at equilibrium level E*. (See Figure l). 
Whether this particular worker is hired or some other secondary completer 
is hired, society gains no additional output. In fact, to the extent that 
the education system uses scarce physical and human capital, output i^ 
actually reduced. There is a small increase in the fraction employed, 
since more teachers are now employed. There may be an adverse, effect 
on income distribution to the extent,, thai; education is .financed-by a 
regressive tax structure. So all in all, there is little if any social 
benefit from educating another person. 
Case 2; Bumping 
Suppose instead thatthis- graduate enters the labour force for 
some less-skilled occupation, say as a gardener; or equivalcntly his 
presence in the labour force for clerks induces some other person in 
that labour force to instead seek a job as a gardener. Then the situa-
tion is as in Figures 2 through 4» Unemployment among clerks is the same 
as it was previously. (Figure 2). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the labour 
market for gardeners. The original supplies of educated and uneducated 
gardeners 
are represented by S in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. The 
DQ's are the demand curves, E^s; the initial equilibria, and W : the 
common rigid wage rates. Since educated gardeners are hired first and 
demand exceeds supply, all educated gardeners are employed. The presence 
of an additional supply of educated gardeners (shift of supply curve to 
S^ in Figure 3) will increase employment of educated gardeners by the same 
amount. The greater availability and employment of educated gardeners 
will lead to thO displ&ceiASnt bdf-tiiiskilied'pardoners,, either." immediately 
by firing or over time by replacement of retirees. If the level of 
employment of educated gardeners has no effect on the productivity of 
uneducated gardeners, the demand curve for uneducated gardeners will shift 
from DQ to D , the leftward shift of the demand curve for uneducated 
gardeners equaling the rightward shift in the supply of educated gardeners 
Hence, total employment of gardeners would be unchanged. To the extent 
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rate 
W * 
Number of clerks 
Figure 1„ Labour Market for Clerks with More Edu-
cated Persons in the Market. 
S„ = S„ 
Number of clerks 
Figure 2. Labour Market for Clerks with Same Number 
of Educated Persons in the Market. 
Number of 
Educated 
Gardeners 
Figure 3. Labour Market for 
Educated Gardeners. 
Number of 
Uneducated 
Gardeners 
Figure 4. Labour Market for 
Uneducated Gardeners. 
-I8rr 
that educated gardeners are more productive than uneducated ones, output 
is increased. 
If, as would he expected, the presence of additional educated 
gardeners raises the productivity of the uneducated gardeners, the 
shift of the: demand curve for uneducated gardeners will he to some 
intermediate position, represented by D^. In this case there will be 
an increase in total employment of gardeners with subsequently greater 
output. The greater the productivity of educated workers relative to 
uneducated and the stronger the positive effccts of employment of 
educated workers on the productivity of unoducated workers, the greater 
the'.output effects of educating more persons. 
The productivity gains realised from a. better-educated work force 
may be. very small in many industries. Literacy may do little to raise 
the productivity of domestics, gardeners, and the like. General 
secondary education may do little for bus drivers, repairmen, and 
craftsmen. Society gains little additional output by educating its 
labour force at such levels. However, this is not always the case. 
For example, there is evidence to suggest that secondary or even primary 
education raises the output of farmers by improving organisational ability, 
facilitating optimal choices cf :.crops and inputs, and making the farmer 
more..roceptivc t.o innovations, information and expert assistance.^ To 
the extent that this is the case, the- social benefits may be considerable. 
Another possible source cf social benefits resulting from a larger 
educational system relates to the contribution of educated persons to 
political development. In many less developed countries, only a fraction 
of primary school leavers are able to continue to. secondary school due to 
space limitations. : The method of selection.relies almost entirely on 
the results of an examination, for instance, the Cambridge Primary 
Examination in the former British colonies. Some potentially outstanding 
students are late developers, others may be ill on the day of the 
examination, and still others may perform poorly due to correctable 
33 See Jon Moris, "Farmer Training as a Strategy of Rural Development" 
in James R. • Shpff-ield, ed ,, Education, Employment and Rural 
Development. Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967, pp.322-365. 
educational deficiencies. The larger the educational system, it is 
argued the greater the chance of educating the "best young people to 
become the future leaders of the country. This argument has long 
been recognised by economists. Wrote Marshall; 
We may then conclude that the -wisdom of expending 
public and private funds is not to be measured by 
its direct fruits alone. It will be profitable 
as a mere-investment, to give the masses of the 
people much greater opportunities and to get the start 
needed for bringing out their latent abilities. And 
the economic value of one industrial genius is 
sufficient to cover the expenses of a whole town.-^ 
I believe this argument has some merit, particularly in light of the 
social goal of equal educational.opportunity for all. However, the 
number of budding young industrial geniue-cs is probably not very large, 
It is doubtful that poor countries can afford the large outlays required 
for the probably small and definitely uncertain benefits. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This analysis of the social returns to education suggests that 
educational programs in labour surplus economies can be divided into 
three categories--in descending order of return: 
(1) Education for very high level or specific skill occupations 
for which a situation of excess demand prevails and is likely 
to persist. 
(2) Education for labour-surplus occupations in which general 
education yields large productivity effects. 
(3) Education for labour-surplus occupations in which there 
are small or negligible productivity effects. 
If-the-social rate of return is accepted as a proper criterion for 
public resource allocation, the implication of this analysis is that 
society should limit the growth of the third category of education and 
invest most heavily in the first and second types until marginal.social 
costs and marginal social benefits are equal. More specifically, .it is 
likely that in less-developed countries, this means holding back on 
general primary and secondary education and rapidly expanding vocational 
and technical, agricultural, and university education. Whether such a 
course is politically feasible is the task of the political scif 
to determine. ' - " - • • 
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